Post-heroic Warfare 

An international conference held by the Oxford Programme on the Changing Character of War, in collaboration with the US Army War College and the Australian Land Warfare Center

Post-heroism is often perceived as one of the main aspects of change in the character of war. Large parts of the contemporary strategic discourse rest on the assumption that war today is no longer fuelled by heroic motivations, and does not produce any popular public heroes, at least not in western democracies. Willingness to kill or die for the cause of one’s socio-political community appears to be either a phenomenon of an historical stage that western states have long left behind or an indicator of nationalistic or religious fanaticism. This is what has been described as the ‘post-heroic condition’ of western societies. According to this view, demographic and cultural changes in the west have severely decreased the tolerance for casualties in war. The proposed conference intends to take a critical look at this idea.

This critical examination seems necessary inasmuch as the idea of the post-heroic condition of contemporary western societies has had and continues to have a large impact on both strategic thinking and operational practice. It has been argued that post-heroism has far-reaching consequences for the ability of western states to wage war.  In particular it has been suggested that the dilemma which confronts the US is that the squeamishness of its own population regarding casualties in war does not allow it to fulfil its role as a great power and as a custodian of the international order. Many strategic thinkers have recommended that military strategy be readjusted to reduce casualties in order to maintain the west’s ability to wage war. This re-adjustment envisages a greater emphasis on the role of air power, the substitution of technology for manpower wherever possible, and a greater reliance on private contractors in a number of roles that were previously filled by the state’s military personnel. However, if the risk of casualties for one or more parties to a conflict is close to zero, this raises the question of whether such military operations would still qualify as ‘war’.

Many of the measures taken to counteract the post-heroic condition of contemporary western societies have been criticised as inadequate. Yet the assumption that we live in a post-heroic society and that this condition diminishes the availability of war as an instrument of foreign policy has remained largely unchallenged. The proposed conference intends to go beyond a critique of the strategic and operational readjust­ments and to question the tacit assumptions on which the concept of post-heroism rests.

The idea of the post-heroic condition of western societies implies that in the past casualties were readily accepted. Yet this is not entirely true even for those wars that we tend to perceive as particularly ‘nationalistic’, such as those of the French Revolution. Equally, the proposition that today’s wars do not call for heroic qualities is questionable. After all, fighting and dying in distant wars demands a special form of heroism about which the home population is indifferent or ignorant. Moreover, although opinion polls may indicate growing public disapproval for military operations due to mounting casualty rates, many democratic governments have been re-elected in spite of this. Even though public opinion may not have much direct effect on foreign policy, it may play an indirect role in that policymakers anticipate its effects and factor it into their decision-making processes. Finally, with regard to the conduct of military operations, public opinion may pull in different directions: it is often said to be averse not only towards friendly casualties but also towards civilian casualties in the target states, with possible trade-offs between both objectives.

The influence of the post-heroic condition on contemporary war is thus more complex than calls for casualty-free warfare suggest. If anything, it leads to a characteristic paradox: on the one hand, if the national interest is not a sufficient motivation for sacrificing the lives of soldiers, policy-makers have to find alternative justifications for the use of military force. In fact, in justifying war, they increasingly draw upon universal values such as human rights and democracy. On the other, they aim to keep the costs of wars as low as possible. Hence, overambitious goals clash with an under-resourced operational reality. The emergence of such paradoxes between the strategic narrative and the operational reality are bound to lead to frustration and disappointment both on the part of the military, who feel they are not equipped to fulfil an overambitious mission, and on the part of the public, who see these missions lingering on without reaching a satisfactory end result.

The conference intends to provide answers to the following questions:

 

Details

The conference will be held on 21st - 23rd March 2011 at the University of Oxford Faculty of History. The registrations will open in September 2010.

For information please e-mail Mike Finch mpmfinch@hotmail.com